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Abstract. The declared objective of recent efforts to reform the Security Council is to 
increase effectiveness. A careful investigation applying certain theses of organization 
theory, however, reveals that neither the prevailing structure nor the working methods of 
the Council unavoidably hamper the achievement of organizational goals; therefore, 
arguments pertaining to the issue of effectiveness do not necessarily justify reform 
proposals. A similar conclusion can be reached by examining other possible causes of 
reform, namely the fundamental change of organizational environment, power struggles 
between various principal organs of the United Nations, and some harshly criticized 
features of the Council itself. It seems that the necessity of reform is rooted in various 
individual and highly subjective interests of member states rather than objective 
circumstances, and the organization has no other option, but to fulfill their demands in 
order to secure its own survival. 
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The United Nations Security Council is unique in numerous aspects. First and 
foremost, it is unique with respect to its composition involving both permanent 
and non-permanent members, its decision-making procedure founded on a 
right of veto of permanent members as well as its exceptionally broad powers 
virtually lacking any institutional control and including a right to adopt legally 
binding decisions. It is also unique owing to its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, extreme flexibility, influence 
on global politics, public recognition and the tremendous amount of attention 
drawn by its activities. Last, but not least it is unique regarding the quantity 
and harshness of criticism formulated against it. There has not existed another 
body in the history of international relations–including its predecessor and 
“companion in misfortune”, the Council of the League of Nations–that has stood 
in the crossfire of criticism for such a long period of time, caused disappointment 
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or been declared a scapegoat with such frequency, or given rise to the need of 
comprehensive reform so often. Even though claims of reorganization are 
coeval with the Council itself, critical voices and calls for reform have sensibly 
grown more abundant at the turn of the millennium. This study, therefore, 
seeks to throw new light on efforts aimed at the reconstruction of the Security 
Council by invoking certain theses of organization theory. 
 
 
I. 
 
Reform is a normal and inevitable part of life in every organization. The 
need for change may originate from a number of sources. It may arise as a 
consequence of external factors, such as fundamental change of organizational 
environment, external pressure of members striving for reallocation of power 
within the organization, or negative judgement by the public opinion.1 Organi-
zations, however, may be compelled to change by various internal factors, as 
well. These factors include, for instance, structural and operational defects in 
the organization, emerging power struggles between organizational units created 
in line with the division of labour, low internalization of organizational values 
or general discontent among members as well as limited membership involve-
ment.2 In case an organization fails to adapt to its new environment, or ignores 
the expectations of its members or the public opinion, it may easily become 
unable to fulfill its tasks and be marginalized or even dissolved. Thus reform, 
  
 1 It is frequently claimed that organizations do not operate in a vacuum. See Blau, P. 
M.–Scott, W. R.: Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach. San Francisco, 1962. 9. 
Being an open system, the organization is in constant interaction with its environment: it is 
both an author and an object of environmental change. Its activities shape the environment, 
the characteristics of which in turn, whether or not produced by the organization, greatly 
determine organizational structure and procedure. The environment, therefore, generates 
specific requirements for the organization, and the better it meets these requirements the 
more successful it will be. See Guiot, J. M.: Szervezetek és magatartásuk. [Organisations 
sociales et comportements] (Ritter, M. transl.) Budapest, 1984. 81. 
 2 Low membership involvement poses an extremely serious problem in voluntary 
organizations primarily established for the mutual benefit of members. International 
organizations come under this category, because states join them in a voluntary manner and 
in anticipation of certain benefits. “Voluntary” in this case means that only those states 
belong to international organizations that have expressed the desire to become members, 
and only those remain members that have not expressed the desire to withdraw. See Virally, 
M.: Definition and Classification of International Organizations: A Legal Approach. In: Abi-
Saab, G. (ed.): The Concept of International Organization. Paris, 1981. 52. 
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as a general rule, is an essential precondition of long-term organizational 
survival rather than a purely aesthetic intervention. 
 This is excellently illustrated by the history of the Warsaw Pact3 and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.4 The former was unavoidably doomed to 
failure at the end of the Cold War, as its members, having regained their 
freedom of choice with the fading of Soviet influence and lacking both the 
internalization of organizational values and the willingness to participate, had 
no intention whatsoever to preserve the organization by means of reform. The 
Warsaw Pact did not have a chance to adapt to the requirements of the new 
world order; therefore, it was terminated on the basis of fundamental change 
of circumstances.5 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on the other hand, 
survived the alteration of organizational environment thanks to the unflagging 
loyalty of its members, and as a result of wide-ranging reforms–including the 
admission of new members, the rearrangement of capabilities and the under-
taking of novel responsibilities in addition to original goals–it was at least 
temporarily able to sustain its raison d’être.6 
 Consequently the emergence and intensification of demands for a 
comprehensive reform of the United Nations, embracing the restructuring of 
the Security Council, is to be considered a normal and inevitable phase of 
organizational lifecycle.7 Irrespective of increased media and public attention, 
  
 3 Promulgated in Hungary by Act No. III of 1955 on the promulgation of the Treaty of 
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of 
Albania, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People’s Republic, the German 
Democratic Republic, the Polish People’s Republic, the Rumanian People’s Republic, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak Republic, signed in Warsaw, on 
14 May 1955. 
 4 Promulgated in Hungary by Act No. I of 1999 on the accession of the Republic of 
Hungary to the North Atlantic Treaty, and on the promulgation of the text of the Treaty. 
 5 Cf. Parliamentary Resolution 54/1990. (VII. 3.) on the relationship between the 
Republic of Hungary and the Warsaw Pact. 
 6 For a detailed analysis, see Asmus, R. D.: A NATO kapunyitása. Az új korszak és a 
szervezet átalakítása [Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New 
Era] (Magyarics, T. transl.). Budapest, 2003; Valki, L. (ed.): A NATO: történet, szervezet, 
stratégia, bővítés [NATO: History, Structure, Strategy, Enlargement] (Gombás, I. transl.). 
Budapest, undated; Wijk, R., de: A NATO az ezredforduló küszöbén. Küzdelem a konszen-
zusért [NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium] (Barta, R. transl.). Debrecen, 1998. 
The comprehensive reform of the alliance verifies the statement according to which 
“[every] organization seeks to survive in whatever way it deems appropriate”. See Hall, R. 
H.: Organizations: Structure and Process. Englewood Cliffs, 1972. 36. (Insertion mine.) 
 7 The restructuring of the Security Council is, therefore, neither independent nor 
absolute objective. Similarly to other efforts, including the strengthening of the General 
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it should not be deemed an extraordinary event or a hard evidence of organi-
zational incapacity. What is more, the delegates participating at the United 
Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco had been 
absolutely aware of the need for future changes. This is made obvious by the 
fact that the final text of the Charter explicitly provides for a general review 
conference, originally not envisaged by the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals8, over 
and above the clause on “regular” amendments.9 There was widespread agree-
ment on the necessity of such conference in San Francisco as it was admitted 
that since the Charter could not be perfect and all eventual developments in 
international affairs could not be anticipated, the organization would have to 
be scrutinized and modified in the light of its experience and the situation then 
prevailing in order to secure its continued existence. Delegates furthermore 
emphasized that the newly inserted provision did not mean that the organi-
zation would be temporary, but on the contrary, this solution would guarantee 
its effectiveness and durability.10 
 The travaux préparatoires suggest that the founders specifically expected a 
need for changes to arise in the future with regard to the Security Council. For 
example, delegates from Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt and Mexico initially called for 
an increase in the size of the Council, but in subsequently withdrawing their 
motions, they expressed their hope that their views would be realized as soon 
as the evolving circumstances permitted.11 The Cuban representative, in 
explaining his refusal of permanent membership on the Council, also pointed 
out that the group of great powers could undergo significant changes in the 
future as it had done throughout history.12 
 For the time being the Charter has been expressly amended only once on 
account of the Security Council: a set of new provisions, effective since 31 
                                                      
Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretariat, it is a means to and an 
inferior goal of the comprehensive reform of the entire organization. For that reason, 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has underlined in various reports that “no reform of the 
United Nations would be complete without reform of the Security Council”. Strengthening 
of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change. Report of the Secretary-General, 9 
September 2002, U.N. Doc. A/57/387, para. 20; In Larger Freedom: Towards Develop-
ment, Security and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 
2005, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, para. 169. 
 8 Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organization, Chapter XI. 
 9 Charter of the United Nations, Arts 108 and 109. Promulgated in Hungary by Act 
No. I of 1956 on the promulgation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 10 See U.N.C.I.O. Docs, Vol. VI, 251; Vol. VII, 438. 
 11 Ibid. Vol. XI, 282. 
 12 Ibid. 291. 
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August 1965, has increased the number of its members from eleven to 
fifteen.13 However, this measure was followed by several de facto amend-
ments and practical modifications affecting both composition and procedure, 
such as the settlement of the question of Chinese and Russian representation, 
the clarification of procedural issues concerning abstention and absence as 
well as various minor changes in the conduct of business performed of the 
Council’s own accord. 
 
 
II. 
 
The declared objective of Security Council reform is the increase of effective-
ness.14 Each and every particular suggestion contained in official or unofficial 
proposals, from the improvement of representativeness to the democratization 
of decision-making to the enhancement of transparency, is merely a means to 
and an inferior goal of the realization of this objective. Hence in the course 
of scrutinizing the necessity of reform, one needs to examine effectiveness 
first. Effectiveness is a notion relating to the goals of an organization or an 
organizational unit–it reflects the degree to which these goals are achieved.15 
Since effectiveness can be measured, it appears to offer a readily applicable 
and objective scale by which not only the necessity, but also the success of 
reform can be judged. Still, this is only make-believe. The determination of 
effectiveness is, in fact, highly problematic as the object of measurement, that 
is to say, organizational goal is far from being such tangible a category as it 
  
 13 G.A. Res. 1991A, 1285th plen. mtg., 17 December 1963, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1991A 
(XVIII). 
 14 G.A. Res. 60/1, 8th plen. mtg., 16 September 2005, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1, para. 153. 
 15 See Barnard, Ch. I.: The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, 1938. 56. Effective-
ness should not be confused with efficiency. The criterion of efficiency dictates that, of 
two alternatives having the same cost in terms of application of resources, that one be 
chosen which will lead to the larger result and the greater attainment of the organizational 
objectives. See Simon, H. A.: Administrative Behavior. A Study of Decision-Making 
Processes in Administrative Organization. New York, 1949. 122, 179. Nonetheless, it is 
obvious that „an organization can be efficient without being effective, and vice versa”. 
Hall: op. cit. 96. In Hungarian, both „effectiveness” and „efficiency” translate into the very 
same expression (hatékonyság). Thus it occurs that under the rubric of effectiveness, authors 
actually discuss the efficiency of the Security Council, that is, its „ability to adopt rational 
decisions on the basis of reliable information in a timely fashion”. See e.g. Turbék Z.: A 
Biztonsági Tanács reformja [The Reform of the Security Council]. Kül-Világ 2 (2005), 37. 
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may seem.16 Nonetheless, any examination of the justification of efforts seeking 
to increase the effectiveness of the Security Council requires a careful 
investigation of the goals of that principal organ. 
 An organizational goal is a state of affairs that the organization attempts to 
realize.17 Being a consensual aggregate of individual interests and efforts of 
members,18 this abstract and collective goal constitutes the purpose of co-
operation within the organization, forms the source of its legitimacy, and 
provides directions for and limitations upon its functioning. The true meaning 
of the concept of organizational goal is, however, much deeper than that. It 
equally embraces official goals as pronounced by the founding instrument as 
well as miscellaneous other documents and statements of high-ranking officials 
of the organization, operative goals as exposed by the “everyday” practices, 
decisions and behaviours of the organization, and even unofficial operative 
goals generated by individual or group interests that can be supportive, 
subversive or irrelevant from the point of view of the organization.19 Which 
should be taken as the basis of determination of effectiveness? Official goals 
are easily identifiable, but frequently vague and ambiguous, operative goals 
are more obvious, but extremely hard to disclose, whereas unofficial operative 
goals are by themselves inadequate for measuring effectiveness as they do not 
form part of the official policy of the organization. Moreover organizational 
goals change with time: the aforementioned case of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization superbly exemplifies that an organization may reconsider the 
relative importance of certain goals, undertake new objectives, or even abandon 
outdated ones. Further difficulties arise from the fact that organizations usually 
have more than one, hierarchically structured goals as a result of which the 
achievement of a given goal can be dependant on the successful realization of 
an additional goal.20 (Not to mention those not entirely rare scenarios in which 
certain organizational goals are in conflict with each other.) 
 The official goals of the United Nations are laid down in the preamble as 
well as in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. Even though a sole section appears 
  
 16 See Champion, D. J.: The Sociology of Organizations. New York, 1975. 41; Hall: op. 
cit. 99–100. 
 17 See Etzioni, A.: Soziologie der Organisationen. [Modern Organizations] (Baetge, J. 
transl.) München, 1967. 16. 
 18 Cf. Simon: op. cit. 114. 
 19 See e.g. Perrow, Ch.: The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations. American 
Sociological Review, 26 (1961), 855–856. 
 20 The structure of organizational goals is hierarchical in a sense that at a given level 
any goal is simultaneously an ultimate goal of a goal inferior to it, and a means of the 
attainment of a more global, superior goal. See Guiot: op. cit. 31–32. 
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to explicitly deal with the purposes of the organization, it is practically impos-
sible to draw a sharp and clear-cut distinction between purposes, principles 
and what is included in the preamble, as emphasized by the rapporteur of a 
committee on general questions at the San Francisco conference. Hence these 
provisions do not bear substantial differences and should be understood and 
applied in function of the others in spite of their being located in three distinct 
structural units.21 
 Being an introduction of the Charter, the preamble reflects the common 
intentions of founding states, which brought them together at the conference in 
San Francisco, moved them to unite their will and efforts, and made them 
harmonize, regulate and organize their international actions.22 The first four 
paragraphs of the preamble, therefore, enumerate the general purposes of the 
organization, that is, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, 
to protect fundamental human rights and equal rights of nations large and 
small, to maintain justice and ensure respect for international law, and to 
promote social progress and better standards of life.23 (The following passages 
of the preamble contain means rather than goals as the two segments are 
connected by the phrase “and for these ends”.) 
 The specific purposes of the organizations are embedded in Article 1. These 
goals are the aggregation of common ends of members, they constitute the 
raison d’être of the organization, and the cause and object of the Charter.24 
Article 1 states that the purposes of the United Nations are: 
 
“1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
  
 21 See U.N.C.I.O. Docs, Vol. VI, 387–388. As purposes and principles are indivisible, 
they together constitute the test for the effectiveness of the organization and the expected 
faithful compliance with the provisions of the Charter. See ibid. 388. The most important 
difference between purposes and principles is that the former directly entail obligations 
neither for the organization nor for the members, whereas the latter undeniably possess a 
normative character. See Randelzhofer, A.: Art. 2. In: Simma, B. (ed.): The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary. Oxford, 1995. 72. 
 22 See U.N.C.I.O. Docs, Vol. VI, 388. 
 23 Charter of the United Nations, preamble. For details, see Cot, J. P.–Pellet, A.: 
Preambule. In: Cot, J. P.–Pellet, A. (ed.): La Charte des Nations Unies. Commentaire Art. 
par Art.. Paris–Bruxelles, 1985. 1–22; Goodrich, L. M.–Hambro, E.: Charter of the United 
Nations. Commentary and Documents. Second, revised edition. London, 1949. 87–92; 
Kelsen, H.: The Law of the United Nations. A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental 
Problems. London, 1951. 3–12; Wolfrum, R.: Preamble. In: Simma: op. cit. 45–48. 
 24 See U.N.C.I.O. Docs, Vol. VI, 388. 
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the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with 
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace;  
 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take 
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;  
 3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems 
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and  
 4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment 
of these common ends.”25 
 
 The operating principles of the organization are contained in Article 2, 
wherein members recognize the sovereign equality of states, and pledge to 
fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed arising from the treaty, to settle 
their international disputes by peaceful means, to refrain from the threat or use 
of force, to give the organization every assistance in any action it takes, and to 
abstain from assisting states against which preventive or enforcement actions 
are taken. In addition, the organization vows to ensure that non-members also 
act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary, and under-
takes not to intervene in matters, which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state.26 
 These purposes and principles all point toward an ultimate goal, an ideal 
hundreds of years old: collective security.27 Collective security is one possible 
  
 25 Charter of the United Nations, Art. 1. The „purpose of purposes” is, of course, to 
maintain peace. Bedjaoui, M.: Art. 1 (Commentaire général). In: Cot–Pellet: op. cit. 24. In 
a similar manner, see Jiménez de Aréchaga, E.: International Law in the Past Third of the 
Century. Recueil des Cours 159 (1978-I), 91. For details, see also Goodrich–Hambro: op. 
cit. 93–98; Kelsen: op. cit. 13–53; Wolfrum, R.: Art. 1. In: Simma: op. cit. 49–56. 
 26 Charter of the United Nations, Art. 2. For details, see Cot–Pellet: op. cit. 71–160 
(contributions by Dupuy, R.-J.–Mbaye, K.–Zoller, E.–Carpentier, J.–Virally, M.–Mahion,  
A.–Guillaume, G.); Goodrich–Hambro: op. cit. 98–121; Randelzhofer: op. cit. 72–76. 
 27 A significant number of scholars of the late Middle Ages and Enlightenment–
including Duc de Sully, Crucé, E. Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, J.-J. Kant, I. and 
Penn, W.–envisaged the preservation of peace in a similar way, within the framework of an 
organization. However, the first collective security organization, the League of Nations, 
was established only after World War I. The Covenant of the League of Nations was 
 THOUGHTS ON THE NECESSITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 151 
  
technique to maintain or restore international peace and security, and to prevent 
or suppress unlawful forceful actions. It is based on the assumption that the 
most expedient means of safeguarding peace is deterrence, that is to say, if 
any potential aggressor acting in a rational manner faces–preferably as early 
as in the preparatory stage of his attack–the overwhelming force of the entire 
centralized collective security system, and as such, inevitable defeat.28 Collective 
security, however, demands a great deal of sacrifice from participating states 
in exchange of benefits offered. The effective functioning of such system 
entails the fulfilment of several subjective and objective requirements. From a 
subjective point of view it necessitates loyalty, confidence, responsible policy-
making, positive commitment, impartiality and even-handedness from members 
with a view to deter or repel an aggressor, whoever that might be. It also calls 
for recognition of interrelatedness and interdependence, partial surrender of free-
dom of action, subordination of national interest to public good, and renunciation 
of unilateral use of force. Collective security, furthermore, objectively requires 
the coexistence and active participation of several great powers of roughly equal 
strength, universal membership, economic vulnerability of members, general 
disarmament, along with an adequate legal environment, and a centralized 
institutional background capable of operating the system and realizing its goals.29 
Thus in the concept of collective security “security represents the end; collective 
defines the nature of the means; system denotes the institutional component”.30 
 In the past six decades collective security has been embodied and insti-
tutionalized by the United Nations. The Security Council contributes to the 
functioning of collective security by means of exercising its powers in line with 
                                                      
promulgated in Hungary by Act No. XXXIII of 1921 on the promulgation of the Treaty of 
Peace with the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, and 
Belgium, China, Cuba, Greece, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, the Serb-
Croat-Slovene State, Siam, and Czechoslovakia, signed at Trianon, on 4 June 1920. 
 28 A system of collective security should not be mistaken for an alliance based on the 
principle of collective defence. The former has universal membership, and is directed against 
an abstract aggressor emerging within the system, while the latter is characterized by 
limited membership embracing like-minded states and a specific external enemy. 
 29 See Claude, I. L., Jr.: Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of Inter-
national Organization. Third, revised edition. New York, 1964. 229–238. See also Basdevant, 
M.: La sécurité collective. L’Organisation de la Paix 5–7 (1936), 9–36; Delbrück, J.: 
Collective Security. In: Bernhardt, R. (ed.): Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Vol. 
3. Use of Force, War and Neutrality, Peace Treaties. Amsterdam–New York–Oxford, 1982. 
104–114; Kelsen, H.: Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of 
the United Nations. American Journal of International Law 42 (1948), 783–796. 
 30 Claude: op. cit. 223. (Italics omitted.) 
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the division of organizational labour. Being part of the system, each and every 
activity it performs serves either directly or indirectly the achievement of the 
official organizational goals, although as a result of the division of labour, its 
own objectives are limited and inferior to the overall organizational goals–
hence there is a part-whole relation between the two categories. What are the 
official goals of the Security Council? There is no provision in the Charter 
under such heading, but the determination of tasks as contained by Article 24 
might as well be considered as goal-setting. This article reads: 
 
“1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its 
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying 
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their 
behalf.  
 2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance 
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers 
granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid 
down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.”31 
 
 To put it briefly, under the chapters listed in paragraph 2, the Security 
Council contributes to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and 
may investigate any dispute or situation, which might lead to international 
friction or give rise to a dispute, and recommend appropriate procedures or 
methods of adjustment. In exercise of its nearly absolute power of discretion, it 
has an exclusive right to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and to make recommendations, adopt 
provisional measures, or take enforcement measures not involving the use of 
armed force, or give authorization to the use of military force with a view to 
suppress such situations. The Council may even decide to utilize regional 
arrangements or agencies in the course of taking enforcement measures if it 
deems that appropriate.32 (The Council, however, no longer exercises its Chapter 
XII powers owing to the termination of the trusteeship system. Furthermore it 
seems to carry out its duties under Article 26 concerning disarmament only in 
part, given that the overwhelming majority of successes on this field have not 
been achieved as a result of its work.33) 
  
 31 Charter of the United Nations, Art. 24. 
 32 See ibid. Arts 33–34, 36–38, 39–42 and 53. 
 33 Ibid. Art. 26: “In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international 
peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and 
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 Bearing all that in mind, the official goals of the Security Council can be 
summarized as follows. First, by contributing to the peaceful settlement of 
disputes it seeks to prevent the emergence of crises involving a threat to or a 
breach of the peace. Second, the Council attempts to ensure the rapid suppression 
of actions amounting to a threat to or a breach of international peace and 
security by resorting to methods it considers suitable, regardless to whether 
these actions occur within or between states. Third, once the situation has been 
normalized, the Council strives to maintain peace by adequate procedures. It 
may be observed that the triad of “prevention–suppression–maintenance” 
perfectly matches the first and most important purpose of the organization as 
laid down in Article 1, paragraph 1. For that reason, the Council can rightly be 
qualified an institutional depositary of collective security, notwithstanding its 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security being 
primary, but admittedly not exclusive.34 
 The operative goals of the Security Council are understandably in harmony 
with official goals, although in the past six decades the body has also pursued 
objectives that can hardly be derived from the text of the Charter. Without 
intention to be exhaustive, the following operative goals can be exposed by 
examining the practice of the Council: to avoid direct confrontation of great 
powers at any cost; to settle crises not involving a direct confrontation of great 
powers as rapidly as possible; to apply enforcement measures in a pragmatic 
fashion; to delay or omit the taking of enforcement measures against un-
predictable regimes; to refrain from serving selfish interests of great powers; 
to impede organizational action in case of disagreement among permanent 
members; to provide a forum for discussion of the most pressing issues of 
international peace and security, and thereby to enable a partial release of 
tensions; to develop innovative solutions in order to overcome various legal 
and practical anomalies, obstacles and challenges; to limit publicity whenever 
it would be inconvenient; to fiercely protect its special powers vis-à-vis other 
                                                      
economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the 
assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Art. 47, plans to be submitted to 
the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of 
armaments.” See Prandler, Á.: Az ENSZ Biztonsági Tanácsa [The U.N. Security Council]. 
Budapest, 1974. 156. 
 34 “The responsibility conferred [upon the Security Council] is »primary«, not exclusive. 
This primary responsibility is conferred upon the Security Council, as stated in Art. 24, »in 
order to ensure prompt and effective action«.” Certain Expenses of the United Nations 
(Art. 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 
1962, 163. (Insertion mine.) 
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principal organs; and to preserve its geopolitical influence and authority.35 
(It should not be forgotten that these are the operative goals of the Security 
Council as an organizational unit. Unofficial goals of Council members, as 
indicated by the fifth element of this enumeration, form a distinct category. 
The occasional and harshly criticized idleness of the Council is a consequence 
of individual goals and interests of members as reflected by their respective 
votes rather than the goals of the body itself. The relevant operative goal of the 
Council is merely to resist the organizational reception of certain individual 
goals in absence of a minimum agreement of its members.) 
 The effectiveness of the Security Council needs to be scrutinized in the 
context of the aforementioned goals. But as the vagueness of these goals leave 
room for divergent interpretations and their achievement requires continuous 
performance, the degree of goal attainment is extremely hard to establish.36 
The next phase of analysis, therefore, implies the elucidation of indicators of 
effectiveness, that is to say, signs unequivocally revealing the existence or 
absence of success of activities. 
 
 
III. 
 
A little simplification facilitates the formulation of the fundamental question 
pertaining to the examination of effectiveness:  How can collective security be 
measured? Which indicators signify whether or not the Security Council as 
depositary of collective security has achieved its objectives? 
 Should the system of collective security be declared effective only if it 
eliminates the risk of violent crisis once and for all? Discord is an inevitable 
part of life in every group of people, thus the possibility of violence is an 
intrinsic feature of relations both within and between human communities. 
Naturally it does not necessarily mean that the actual eruption of hostilities is 
predestined. But an overly intensive clash of interests, or a failure or deliberate 
rejection of peaceful settlement mechanisms may easily render conflict resolu-
tion by civilized means, and as a result, the prevention of breaches of the peace 
impossible. Even if it occurs, it should not be seen as a fault of the collective 
  
 35 Innovative solutions mentioned in the enumeration above include, for instance, the 
practice of authorizations to use force, the creation and development of peacekeeping, the 
establishment of international criminal tribunals, and the introduction of sanctions against 
individuals, legislation and alternative forms of consultation. 
 36 Measuring effectiveness is more difficult if the organization has a permanent goal. 
See Etzioni: op. cit. 21. 
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security system. Prevention by peaceful dispute settlement is but one of the 
elements of collective security, the failure of which is not only anticipated by the 
system–that envisages the implementation of other procedures in such cases–but 
also constitutes the primary reason for its existence. A perpetual elimination of 
international and non-international crises posing threat to peace is, consequently, 
an inapplicable standard for the measurement of effectiveness of a collective 
security system. Success in absolute terms might be imaginable in a utopia, but 
is inconceivable in a world of states. 
 If the absolute absence of violent crisis cannot be utilized as indicator of 
effectiveness of collective security, could relative success serve as such? As 
commonly known, the frequency of international armed conflicts drastically 
decreased after World War II as compared to the previous era.37 Somewhat 
shadowed by an alarmingly high number of non-international armed conflicts, 
which may likewise seriously threaten international peace, this delightful 
tendency begs the question as to what extent this decrease can be attributed 
to the functioning of the collective security system. It is difficult to give a 
definitive answer, because the behaviours and decisions of states are shaped 
by numerous considerations. The deterrent effect of enforcement actions of 
the Security Council to some extent undeniably contributes to the significant 
decrease of the number of international armed conflicts. From this point of 
view, the system does work effectively. Equally undisputable is the fact, 
however, that it is not the only reason why states tend to avoid direct military 
confrontation since the end of World War II. The deep internalization of the 
comprehensive prohibition of the use of force, the strength of the enemy, or the 
expected reaction by domestic or international public opinion sometimes can 
have as much, if not more, restraining force as an enforcement action taken by 
the Council, and hopefully implemented by member states. The low frequency of 
international armed conflicts, therefore, only partially indicates the effectiveness 
of collective security. (This “indicator” certainly fails to reveal the effectiveness 
of management of non-international conflicts, although they also come under 
the scope of the system.) 
 Having that in mind, in appears more expedient to focus our investigation 
on activities of the Security Council aimed at the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace and security rather than the sheer number of conflicts. 
Between 17 January 1946 and 30 June 2006 the Council has held 5,481 meetings, 
and passed 1,693 resolutions. The quantity of official meetings and numbered 
resolutions, however, does not provide a clear picture of the actual volume of 
  
 37 See A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, para. 11. 
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work. As have been mentioned in passing with regard to operative goals,38 the 
Security Council has developed certain “alternative” forms of consultation 
besides official meetings. The most important among these are perhaps informal 
consultations held in private with the exclusion of both the public and other 
members of the organization. Even though these consultations officially do not 
even qualify as meetings, and have neither statutory basis nor numbers, 
members are inclined to use them to revise previous decisions or enforcement 
measures, to discuss issues related to peacekeeping, to hear reports, or for any 
other purposes. No records are made at informal consultations, but with a view 
to secure a minimum amount of transparency, the president habitually holds 
informal briefings to other member states “on behalf of members of the Security 
Council” as opposed to official meetings after which he makes statements 
“on behalf of the Security Council”. Evidently informal consultations also 
provide an opportunity for making decisions, yet these cannot be classified as 
resolutions and their legal nature is subject to debates.39 The significance and 
practical weight of informal consultations is well illustrated by the fact that 
their number markedly surpassed that of official meetings in every year in the 
period between 1990 and 2000.40 
 It is also worth noting that a variety of other consultations exist involving 
one or more members of the Security Council. These consultations include, for 
example, meetings of caucus groups (permanent members, western permanent 
members, European Union member states, or non-aligned countries), contact 
groups or groups of friends as well as meetings with troop contributors, “Arria 
formula” meetings with other member states or third parties, and “Somavía 
formula” meetings with the participation of non-governmental organizations.41 
 The number of resolutions cannot measure the true performance of the 
Security Council either for two main reasons. First, several decisions assume a 
form other than a resolution and appear, for instance, in presidential statements 
or communiqués. Second, under special circumstances even the rejection of a 
draft resolution can promote the effective functioning of the system of 
collective security. In this case there is no perceptible output, nevertheless the 
  
 38 Cf. supra note 35. 
 39 See Bailey, S. D.–Daws, S.: The Procedure of the Security Council. Third edition. 
Oxford, 1998. 61–68. 
 40 See Table on Number of Security Council Meetings and Consultations: 1988–
2002. (B. Holt, K. Muller et al. prep.) at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/data/ 
secmgtab.htm. 
 41 See Bailey–Daws: op. cit. 68–75. The number of official meetings neither reflects 
the volume of work within sanctions committees functioning as “committees of the whole”. 
See ibid. 365. 
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idleness of the Council–once again, exceptionally, not as a general rule–may 
advance international peace and security. (Horribile dictu, it is partly due to 
the idleness of the Security Council brought about by lack of unanimity of its 
permanent members that the already tense relations of opposing blocs had not 
deteriorated further during the Cold War.) 
 Consequently, one needs to take into consideration indicators better suited 
to measure effectiveness in addition to figures relating to official meetings and 
resolutions, such as the number of resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, the rate of occurrence of non-armed and armed enforcement 
actions as well as relevant statistical data concerning peacekeeping missions. 
 From among Security Council resolutions passed between 17 January 1946 
and 30 June 2006 as many as 367 were adopted with respect to threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression: 324 resolutions contain 
an explicit reference to Chapter VII, whereas the remaining 43 resolutions 
merely determine the existence of a treat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or 
an act of aggression without expressly referring to the chapter itself.42 In these 
resolutions the Council has taken enforcement actions not involving the use of 
force against states, entities or individuals in the wake of several grave crises 
often affecting more than one country.43 
 The Security Council had authorized the use of force only on two occasions 
during the Cold War; however, the frequency of such actions has remarkably 
increased subsequent to the downfall of the bipolar world. Hence by mid-2006 
the Council has deemed the use of military coercion necessary with regard to 
more than a dozen conflicts.44 (It should be noted that the number of crises is 
definitely not equal to the number of resolutions containing enforcement 
  
 42 See Johansson, P.: UN Security Council Chapter VII Resolutions, 1946–2002: An 
Inventory. Uppsala, 2003. The number of Chapter VII resolutions adopted between 1 January 
2003 and 30 June 2006 was established by the author. Figures indicated do not contain 
resolutions that merely refer to a Chapter VII resolution, but contain neither an express nor 
an implied reference to that chapter. 
 43 During the period under consideration, enforcement actions not involving the use of 
force has been taken in Afghanistan, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia. Cf. http://www.un. 
org/News/ossg/sanction.htm. 
 44 During the period under consideration, the Security Council has authorized the use 
of force in Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(and formerly in Eastern Zaire), Haiti, Iraq, Korea, Lebanon, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Southern Rhodesia, Timor-Leste, and the former Yugoslavia. (Depending on inter-
pretation, Liberia and Sudan may be added, as well.) 
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measures. The Security Council has passed countless resolutions pertaining to 
each crisis, and sometimes decided to take armed or non-armed enforcement 
actions more than once. It has to be emphasized also that certain resolutions leave 
room for divergent interpretations or classifications, so the aforementioned 
statistics may slightly deviate from data originating from other sources.45) 
 The United Nations has established sixty peacekeeping missions in more than 
forty countries of five continents between 29 May 1948 and 30 June 2006.46 
The overwhelming majority of these operations were dispatched by the Security 
Council, while only two missions were set up by the General Assembly.47 As of 
the last day of the period under consideration, fifteen peacekeeping missions 
has been in operation in addition to twelve special political and peacebuilding 
missions directed and supported either by the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations or the Department of Political Affairs. The total number of personnel 
serving in the ongoing fifteen peacekeeping missions has been 87,707, whereas 
the number of personnel serving in special political and peacebuilding missions 
has amounted to 2,256. Altogether 109 member states of the organization have 
so far contributed with uniformed personnel to the success of peace operations, 
and the estimated total cost of these operations has exceeded 41 billion dollars.48 
 These figures indeed speak for themselves; still they do not reflect the actual 
effectiveness of measures of the Security Council. A handful of commonly 
known and clear-cut cases apart, such as the success in Cambodia or the 
tragedy in Rwanda, the practical effectiveness of enforcement measures and 
peacekeeping operations are subject to divergent assessments. It has occurred 
time and again that the Council, the affected state, the members of the inter-
  
 45 For example, some authors maintain that the Security Council has authorized the use 
of force also in Albania, the Central African Republic, and Guinea-Bissau. Cf. Blokker, N.: 
Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to 
Authorize the Use of Force by “Coalitions of the Able and Willing”. European Journal of 
International Law 11 (2000), 544. 
 46 See http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko. This figure does not contain missions 
authorized by the Security Council, but functioning outside the auspices of the United 
Nations, such as Kosovo Force (KFOR), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or 
Operation Artemis. 
 47 These two missions were the United Nations Emergency Force I. (UNEF I.) and 
the United Nations Security Force/United Nations Temporary Executive Authority 
(UNSF/UNTEA). Cf. Bothe, M.: Peace-keeping. In: Simma: op. cit. 587–588. 
 48 See United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Peace and Security Section, United 
Nations Department of Public Information, July 2006, DPI/1634/Rev. 61; United Nations 
Political and Peacebuilding Missions. Peace and Security Section, United Nations Depart-
ment of Public Information, July 2006, DPI/2166/Rev. 36. 
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national community and the public opinion have evaluated the achievements of 
a given action in a contradictory manner.49 With the success of suppression of 
crises being in most instances relative, and the results of conflict prevention and 
maintenance of peace being intangible, one may hardly answer the question 
pertaining to the effectiveness of the Security Council with a definitive “yes” 
or “no”.50 
 Nonetheless, in the light of achievements it can be plausibly stated that the 
prevailing structure and working methods of the Security Council are equally 
adequate for the attainment of organizational goals, that is to say, the body is 
perfectly capable of effective functioning even as it is–with existing objective 
limitations, of course, such as the absence of agreements under Article 43 of 
the Charter.51 A continuous and systematic utilization of this capability depends 
exclusively on the willingness of Council members as well as states and inter-
national organizations obliged or requested to implement its decisions. Neither 
the current structure nor the working methods of the Security Council hamper 
effective functioning: the real obstacle emanates from subversive unofficial 
operative goals and political interests of states. Restructuring and reorganization 
of work are, therefore, not inescapable preconditions of increasing effectiveness–
this objective could be achieved simply by enhancing the willingness of states 
participating in the making or the implementation of decisions in some other 
  
 49 In absence of universally applicable indicators of effectiveness, differences in the 
determination of the degree of goal attainment are fairly common in the world of organi-
zations. In addition, the more complex an organizational goal is the more difficult the 
measuring of effectiveness becomes. See Hall: op. cit. 98-103. As regards public opinion, 
it can be stated that “people’s attitudes toward the United Nations and other international 
organizations tend to be associated with their beliefs (1) as to the extent to which such 
organizations affect their own and other nations, and (2) whether the observed or imagined 
effects are »good« or »bad«.” Sprout, H.–Sprout, M.: Foundations of International Politics. 
Princeton, 1962. 569. 
 50 For a similar opinion concerning the entire organization, see Seidel, G.: Ist die UN-
Charta noch zeitgemäβ? Archiv des Völkerrechts 33 (1995), 22. Nevertheless, the High-
level Panel admitted that the effectiveness of the Council has increased since the end of the 
Cold War. See A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, para. 246. 
See also Higgins, R.: Peace and Security: Achievements and Failures. European Journal of 
International Law 6 (1995), 445–460. 
 51 Charter of United Nations, Art. 43, paragraph 1: “All Members of the United Nations, 
in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake 
to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special 
agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of 
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” 
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way. (It might be added that new states are apparently keen on joining the 
United Nations, which arguably indicates a somewhat firm belief in the 
effectiveness of the collective security system.) 
 
 
IV. 
 
Since arguments pertaining to the increase of effectiveness of the Security 
Council do not necessarily justify calls for reform, one may raise the question 
as to what other circumstances could render a comprehensive restructuring so 
imperative. Could a fundamental change of organizational environment provide 
sufficient basis for reform proposals? 
 The Security Council was designed during World War II on the basis of 
international relations and potential threats of that period. Accordingly, the 
founders were chiefly guided by a desire to prevent the recurrence of a world 
war, to establish an effective mechanism for the suppression of interstate 
conflicts and to preserve the contemporaneous status quo when they drafted the 
structure, powers and procedure of the Council. The principal organ created 
under the sign of the “One World” paradigm, however, had never had the 
opportunity to operate under circumstances originally imagined – instead, it 
had to face the realities of Cold War as early as at its second meeting.52 
 The environment once again changed with the downfall of the bipolar 
world, when a network of previously unknown or underestimated threats and 
challenges has emerged. The collapse of the Soviet bloc brought about the end 
of a delicate balance of power, but the sole remaining superpower has soon 
proved to be incapable and unwilling to guarantee world peace even with the 
support of its allies. The disappearance of great power domination over small 
states in former zones of influence has led to the surfacing of hitherto contained 
tensions of ethnic, economic, territorial or other nature, and paved the way to 
the eruption of violent conflicts involving fatalities and flows of refugees on 
a scale of millions. Partly in relation to these conflicts grave violations of 
human rights and transnational organized crime, particularly arms trade, drugs 
trafficking and money laundering, have become alarmingly frequent. By the turn 
of the millennium international terrorism as well as proliferation of weapons of 
  
 52 Cf. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 1946–1951. New York, 1954. 
300–301. On changes of paradigm in international relations in the second half of the 20th 
century, see McWhinney, E.: The United Nations and a New World Order for a New 
Millennium. Self-determination, State Succession, and Humanitarian Intervention. The 
Hague–London–Boston, 2000. 3 et seq. 
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mass destruction backed both by authoritarian regimes and terrorist organi-
zations has also grown to be a burning issue. Serious challenges have likewise 
arisen from problems of the Third World, unequal distribution of global wealth, 
exploitation of natural resources, extreme poverty, famine, water shortage, and 
various diseases, all of which continuously reproduce the sources of conflicts 
unless taken care of by adequate measures. Finally, even positive phenomena, 
such as the rapid development of technology, globalization or increasing 
economic interdependence, may clearly entail security hazards.53 
 According to Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change one of the principal tasks for any reform of the Security 
Council is to enhance its capacity and willingness to act in the face of new 
threats.54 Before one would unreservedly accept this statement, it is worth 
briefly examining as to what extent this task is necessary. Although the Security 
Council was primarily constructed to deal with interstate conflicts, the founders 
were completely aware of that it would function in a dynamically changing 
environment. In order to ensure prompt and effective settlement of situations 
endangering international peace and security, the Council was endowed with 
an exceptionally broad, nearly absolute power of discretion. Its authority is 
restrained by the following three sets of rules only: the peremptory norms of inter-
national law, the Charter of the United Nations, and its own Provisional Rules of 
Procedure.55 This virtually absolute power enables the Council to take action 
straight away against any new threat or challenge in a manner it deems fit.56 
 The opinion of the High-level Panel calls for supplementary remarks 
concerning willingness, as well. Namely, occasional reluctance from resolute 
action stems from subversive unofficial operative goals of members rather than 
any structural defect of the Security Council itself. As commonly known, the 
collective will of that organ is established as an aggregate of individual wills of 
  
 53 See We, the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century. Millennium 
Report of the Secretary-General, 3 April 2000, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000, para. 5, 31–40, 66–75, 
189–197; A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, para. 
11–23; In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. 
Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, para. 6–11, 76–86. 
 54 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, para. 248. 
 55 See Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev. 7. 
 56 In a similar manner, see G.A. Res. 60/1, 8th plen. mtg., 16 September 2005, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/60/1, para. 79. 
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members in line with Article 27 of the Charter.57 The Council is “willing” to act 
only if at least nine of its members, acting on behalf of every member state of 
the organization, are willing to act and neither permanent member dissents. 
Otherwise the Council will be paralyzed.58 Hence the containment of threats 
and challenges emerging at the turn of the millennium could be secured with-
out the restructuring of the Security Council–only the motivational deficiencies 
of members need to be remedied, as already mentioned. (The reform might 
nevertheless serve as sufficient motivation for states, but it has nothing to do 
with organizational environment.) In sum, owing to its exceptionally broad 
powers, the Council is capable of taking effective action against any traditional 
or new threat or challenge provided that its members are willing to cooperate. 
The fundamental change of organizational environment, therefore, does not 
provide an acceptable explanation for the necessity of reform. 
 Since the Security Council is theoretically capable of effective functioning 
even in the prevailing environment, one has to address the question whether 
power struggles within the United Nations could possibly substantiate reform. 
As already mentioned, the responsibility of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security is primary, but not exclusive. 
Owing to its general competence as well as “early warning” and preventive 
functions, respectively, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General are 
likewise involved with this particular subject.59 Similarly to other organi-
zations, specific responsibilities of principal organs of the United Nations have 
given rise to different sub-unit interests, the conflict of which has at times 
brought about fierce power struggles. (Suffice it to recall debates surrounding 
the “Uniting for Peace“ resolution.60) Given that the relevant powers of the 
Council are exclusive, these conflicts actually do not affect its effectiveness. In 
  
 57 Charter of the United Nations, Art. 27: “1. Each member of the Security Council 
shall have one vote.  
 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an 
affirmative vote of nine members.  
 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided 
that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Art. 52, a party to a dispute 
shall abstain from voting.” 
 58 The failure of certain draft resolutions is a normal phenomenon in the conduct of 
business that can barely be labeled as a shortcoming. The veto cannot be qualified a 
deficiency either, as it is essential for the achievement of the dominant operative goal: the 
avoidance of direct confrontation of great powers. 
 59 See Charter of the United Nations, Arts 10–12 and 99. 
 60 G.A. Res. 377A, 302nd plen. mtg., 3 November 1950, U.N. Doc. A/RES/377A (V). 
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other words, power struggles within the organization at most justify minor 
adjustments in the relationship of organs concerned, but fall short of substan-
tiating a comprehensive reform of the Security Council. 
 Last, but not least one should examine whether some regularly criticized 
features of the Council–namely lack of representativeness, undemocratic decision-
making and absence of transparency–may plausibly necessitate reforms. It is 
easy to comprehend that in order to be able to fulfill its responsibilities in a 
timely and effective manner, the Council must be reasonably small, and due to 
the political sensitiveness of its decisions, it must work in private to some 
extent. In consequence, the lack of representativeness, undemocratic decision-
making and absence of transparency all stem from the special responsibility of 
the Council, that is, the maintenance and restoration of international peace and 
security. These features by themselves do not undermine effectiveness–on the 
contrary, from a certain point of view they are the very basis thereof. They 
constitute the price of participation in the strictly centralized collective security 
system. Sovereign members of the system, however, are willing to “pay” that 
price only in so far as they are satisfied with benefits received. If the Security 
Council carried out its duties with absolute effectiveness and to the content-
ment of every member state, the features in question would hardly be an issue 
of such gravity. But as the effectiveness of the Council significantly oscillates 
in practice (despite that it is capable of maximum effectiveness), quite a few 
member states–particularly disappointed subjects of failed crisis management 
activities, principal financial and troop contributors as well as states that merely 
perceive an opportunity for a reallocation of power within the organization–
consider the “price” intolerable, and prove reluctant to recognize the authority 
of such oligarchic body of doubtful effectiveness. Even though failures of the 
Council are chiefly caused by their own indolence (negative votes, denial of 
cooperation), unsatisfied states urge reforms: invoking the Council’s lack of 
representativeness and transparency and its undemocratic decision-making, 
they demand deeper involvement in the making of decisions and insight into 
the confidential details of work. Their frustration may weaken the authority of 
the Security Council, decrease the willingness of member states to implement 
its decisions, and ultimately, it may further reduce the chance of successful goal-
attainment.61 Features that were originally meant to guarantee effectiveness are 
thereby transformed into obstacles in the way of effectiveness requiring 
  
 61 On authority and execution of authoritative communications in formal organizations, 
see Barnard: op. cit. 163, 166. It is noteworthy that members of voluntary organizations 
with poorly defined objectives tend to have the narrowest range of acceptance of authority. 
Simon: op. cit. 134. The United Nations is such an organization. 
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comprehensive reforms. (Negative public opinion works in a more or less similar 
fashion, although it exerts destructive effects on the organization through the 
medium of member state governments tracking the general attitude of voters 
rather than directly.) 
 We have thus reached the genuine reason of Security Council reform, 
which is to sustain membership involvement. It appears that the necessity of 
reorganization arises not as a result of the Council’s alleged incapacity of 
effective functioning or facing new challenges of the post-Cold War era. It is 
neither indispensable on account of lack of representativeness, undemocratic 
decision-making or absence of transparency. The reform of the Security Council 
is necessary because the majority of member states, acting upon divergent 
considerations, demands modifications. These claims are expressed both within 
and outside the organization. Accordingly, even though power struggles between 
the General Assembly and the Security Council cannot objectively substantiate 
reform proposals, the immense political pressure of members within the 
framework of the plenary organ might prove sufficient for coercing changes. 
This struggle has been going on for decades, although its intensity has varied 
with the alteration of political environment.62 The pressure remarkably increased 
by the end of the Cold War: the General Assembly has been continuously 
keeping the issue on its agenda since 14 December 1979,63 and adopted a 
number of resolutions since 11 December 1992,64 what is more, on 3 December 
1993, it has established an Open-ended Working Group to consider all aspects 
of the question of Security Council reform.65 Hitherto the Council has been 
able to withstand the pressure of the General Assembly. It has created its own 
Informal Working Group to identify desirable changes in the practice of 
documentation and other procedural questions, and conspicuously strives to 
introduce any adjustments not requiring an amendment of the Charter of its 
own accord.66 Interestingly enough, these measures not only illustrate the 
ability of the Council to resist changes, but also reveal the limited nature of 
  
 62 The General Assembly had urged the restructuring of the Security Council as 
early as late 1959. G.A. Res. 1404, 843rd plen. mtg., 25 November 1959, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/1404 (XIV). 
 63 G.A. Dec. 34/431, 104th plen. mtg., 14 December 1979. See also Bailey–Daws: op. 
cit. 383; Fassbender, B.: UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constit-
utional Perspective. The Hague–London–Boston, 1998. 221. 
 64 G.A. Res. 47/62, 84th plen. mtg., 11 December 1992, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/62. 
 65 G.A. Res. 48/26, 69th plen. mtg., 3 December 1993, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/26. 
 66 See e.g. Note by the President of the Security Council, 19 July 2006, U.N. Doc. 
S/2006/507. 
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that ability. Therefore, it remains to be seen how long the Council can and will 
endure under the mounting pressure. 
 Certain states demanding reform of the Security Council are undeniably 
guided by an earnest desire to increase effectiveness. Others rather wish to gain 
broader control over their resources placed at the disposal of the organization, 
while still others merely seek to acquire a position within the organization that 
corresponds to their perceived political or economic weight. Reform proposals, 
consequently, originate from various individual and highly subjective interests 
rather than objective factors. (It also excellently portrays how reform as an 
unofficial operative goal of selected members is converted into an operative 
goal of the entire organization. The reception of this goal by the organization 
has been admittedly facilitated by the fact that adequately communicated 
measures taken in the general direction of reform may contribute to the 
temporary preservation of organizational legitimacy even without significant 
achievements.) Since the United Nations is a voluntary organization,67 it cannot 
ignore the demands of its members, irrespective of the degree to which these 
are justifiable. If member states require reforms, the organization–in order to 
secure its survival68–must attempt to fulfill this requirement even if the problems 
with which members try to substantiate their aspirations primarily emerge as a 
result of low membership involvement rather than any critical structural defect 
of the principal organ under consideration. It has to be emphasized once again 
that the Security Council would be an appropriate means to reach its specific 
organizational goals as it is, if members of the United Nations did not condemn 
it to idleness by frequently obstructing its work or declining sufficient 
assistance for its actions out of sheer self-interest.69 
 The founders of the organization not only anticipated the need of changes 
to arise in the future, but also the likely behaviour of member states. For that 
  
 67 See supra note 2. 
 68 The theory of organizational equilibrium holds that members of an organization are 
both positively and negatively motivated to participate in the organization. The former 
represents the benefits provided by the organization to its members, while the latter 
symbolizes the contribution of members to the co-operation within the organization. 
Members participate in the organization until their benefits originating from membership 
outweigh their contributions. Thus the organization can endure only as long as it is able to 
transform incoming contributions into benefits, and redistribute them to members in a 
satisfactory manner, thereby ensuring their continuous participation and further contribu-
tions. Cf. Barnard: op. cit. 56–59. 
 69 “An international or regional organization’s impotence is always the result of its 
members’ policies.”  Hoffmann, S.: Thoughts on the UN at Fifty. European Journal of Inter-
national Law, 6 (1995), 322. 
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reason, President Harry S. Truman had addressed the following solemn instruc-
tions to delegates on the occasion of signing the Charter of the United Nations: 
 
“You have created a great instrument for peace and security and human 
progress in the world. The world must now use it! If we fail to use it, we shall 
betray all those who have died in order that we might meet here in freedom 
and safety to create it. If we seek to use it selfishly–for the advantage of 
any one nation or any small group of nations–we shall be equally guilty of 
that betrayal. The successful use of this instrument will require the united 
will and firm determination of the free peoples who have created it. The job 
will tax the moral strength and fibre of us all.”70 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The reform of the Security Council had been anticipated by the founders of the 
United Nations as a normal and inevitable event in the life of the organization. 
Even though efforts aimed at comprehensive restructuring are coeval with this 
unique body, the turn of the millennium has witnessed a significant increase of 
critical voices and a strengthening of calls for reform. 
 The declared objective of reform proposals is to enhance the effectiveness, 
in other words, the degree of goal-attainment of the Security Council. A careful 
investigation of organizational goals and relevant practice, however, reveals 
that a definitive statement concerning the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the 
Council can hardly be formulated as its record comprises both tragic failures 
and outstanding achievements. At any rate, these achievements indicate that 
the Council is capable of effective functioning even in its current form, thus 
neither its prevailing structure nor its working methods unavoidably hamper 
the attainment of organizational goals. The real obstacle in the way of maximum 
effectiveness emanates from subversive unofficial operative goals and interests 
of members, not from the current establishment. Hence a radical reorganization 
of the Security Council both in terms of structure and working methods is not an 
inescapable precondition of enhancing effectiveness, and in consequence, such 
arguments do not plausibly justify reform proposals. 
 The fundamental change of organizational environment that occurred after 
the end of the Cold War likewise fails to substantiate the need for reform because 
  
 70 Address by the President of the United States of America at the Closing Plenary 
Session of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 26 
June 1945. U.N.C.I.O. Docs, Vol. I, 716. 
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the Council has remained perfectly capable of taking prompt and effective 
action against any traditional or new threat or challenge by relying on its 
exceptionally broad powers and vast inventory in the field of maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security–provided, of course, that its 
members are sufficiently motivated. Similarly, power struggles between the 
General Assembly and the Security Council as well as certain intrinsic features 
of the Council–namely lack of representativeness, undemocratic decision-making, 
and absence of transparency–cannot convincingly explain the necessity of 
comprehensive reform either. 
 It appears that reform proposals are rooted in various individual and highly 
subjective interests rather than objective circumstances. Therefore, the reform 
of the Security Council is necessary simply because the majority of member 
states, acting upon divergent considerations, demands modifications. Since the 
United Nations is a voluntary organization, it cannot ignore the demands of its 
members. In order to secure continuous membership involvement, and thereby 
its very survival, the organization must attempt to fulfill these demands even if 
the problems with which member states try to substantiate their aspirations 
primarily emerge as a result of their own indolence, not as a result of critical 
structural or procedural shortcomings of the Security Council. 
   
 
